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The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Chen, Yi-Chun, Mueller-Frank, Manuel, Pai, Mallesh M
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2021
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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