Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete Information
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2021
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| _version_ | 1866916362084941824 |
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| author | Imber, Aviram Israel, Jonas Brill, Markus Kimelfeld, Benny |
| author_facet | Imber, Aviram Israel, Jonas Brill, Markus Kimelfeld, Benny |
| contents | We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about the approval preferences of voters. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of candidates into approved, disapproved, and unknown candidates, possibly with ordinal preference constraints among candidates in the latter category. This captures scenarios where voters have not evaluated all candidates and/or it is unknown where voters draw the threshold between approved and disapproved candidates. We study the complexity of some fundamental computational problems for a number of classic approval-based committee voting rules including Proportional Approval Voting and Chamberlin-Courant. These problems include determining whether a given set of candidates is a possible or necessary winning committee and whether a given candidate is possibly or necessarily a member of the winning committee. We also consider proportional representation axioms and the problem of deciding whether a given committee is possibly or necessarily representative. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2103_14847 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete Information Imber, Aviram Israel, Jonas Brill, Markus Kimelfeld, Benny Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity Multiagent Systems We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about the approval preferences of voters. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of candidates into approved, disapproved, and unknown candidates, possibly with ordinal preference constraints among candidates in the latter category. This captures scenarios where voters have not evaluated all candidates and/or it is unknown where voters draw the threshold between approved and disapproved candidates. We study the complexity of some fundamental computational problems for a number of classic approval-based committee voting rules including Proportional Approval Voting and Chamberlin-Courant. These problems include determining whether a given set of candidates is a possible or necessary winning committee and whether a given candidate is possibly or necessarily a member of the winning committee. We also consider proportional representation axioms and the problem of deciding whether a given committee is possibly or necessarily representative. |
| title | Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete Information |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.14847 |