Turning Federated Learning Systems Into Covert Channels

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Costa, Gabriele, Pinelli, Fabio, Soderi, Simone, Tolomei, Gabriele
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2021
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author Costa, Gabriele
Pinelli, Fabio
Soderi, Simone
Tolomei, Gabriele
author_facet Costa, Gabriele
Pinelli, Fabio
Soderi, Simone
Tolomei, Gabriele
contents Federated learning (FL) goes beyond traditional, centralized machine learning by distributing model training among a large collection of edge clients. These clients cooperatively train a global, e.g., cloud-hosted, model without disclosing their local, private training data. The global model is then shared among all the participants which use it for local predictions. In this paper, we put forward a novel attacker model aiming at turning FL systems into covert channels to implement a stealth communication infrastructure. The main intuition is that, during federated training, a malicious sender can poison the global model by submitting purposely crafted examples. Although the effect of the model poisoning is negligible to other participants, and does not alter the overall model performance, it can be observed by a malicious receiver and used to transmit a single bit.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2104_10561
institution arXiv
publishDate 2021
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Turning Federated Learning Systems Into Covert Channels
Costa, Gabriele
Pinelli, Fabio
Soderi, Simone
Tolomei, Gabriele
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Federated learning (FL) goes beyond traditional, centralized machine learning by distributing model training among a large collection of edge clients. These clients cooperatively train a global, e.g., cloud-hosted, model without disclosing their local, private training data. The global model is then shared among all the participants which use it for local predictions. In this paper, we put forward a novel attacker model aiming at turning FL systems into covert channels to implement a stealth communication infrastructure. The main intuition is that, during federated training, a malicious sender can poison the global model by submitting purposely crafted examples. Although the effect of the model poisoning is negligible to other participants, and does not alter the overall model performance, it can be observed by a malicious receiver and used to transmit a single bit.
title Turning Federated Learning Systems Into Covert Channels
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.10561