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Human strategic decision making in parametrized games

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Ganzfried, Sam
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2021
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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