Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Dianat, Ahrash, Freer, Mikhail
Format: Preprint
Published: 2021
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author Dianat, Ahrash
Freer, Mikhail
author_facet Dianat, Ahrash
Freer, Mikhail
contents We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who receives the revenue from the auction and who (depending on the treatment) has agency to determine the outcome of the auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-credible second-price auction fails to converge to the first-price auction. We provide a behavioral explanation for our results based on sellers' aversion to rule-breaking, which is confirmed by an additional experiment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2105_00204
institution arXiv
publishDate 2021
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test
Dianat, Ahrash
Freer, Mikhail
General Economics
Economics
We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who receives the revenue from the auction and who (depending on the treatment) has agency to determine the outcome of the auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-credible second-price auction fails to converge to the first-price auction. We provide a behavioral explanation for our results based on sellers' aversion to rule-breaking, which is confirmed by an additional experiment.
title Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.00204