Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2021
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| _version_ | 1866908987526479872 |
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| author | Bó, Inácio Chen, Li |
| author_facet | Bó, Inácio Chen, Li |
| contents | We provide an original analysis of historical documents to describe the assignment procedures used to allocate entry-level civil service jobs in China from the tenth to the early twentieth century. The procedures tried to take different objectives into account through trial and error. By constructing a formal model that combines these procedures into a common framework, we compare their effectiveness in minimizing unfilled jobs and prioritizing high-level posts. We show that the problem was inherently complex such that changes made to improve the outcome could have the opposite effect. Based on a small modification of the last procedure used, we provide a new mechanism for producing maximum matchings under constraints in a transparent and public way. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2105_02457 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service Bó, Inácio Chen, Li Theoretical Economics We provide an original analysis of historical documents to describe the assignment procedures used to allocate entry-level civil service jobs in China from the tenth to the early twentieth century. The procedures tried to take different objectives into account through trial and error. By constructing a formal model that combines these procedures into a common framework, we compare their effectiveness in minimizing unfilled jobs and prioritizing high-level posts. We show that the problem was inherently complex such that changes made to improve the outcome could have the opposite effect. Based on a small modification of the last procedure used, we provide a new mechanism for producing maximum matchings under constraints in a transparent and public way. |
| title | Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.02457 |