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Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bó, Inácio, Chen, Li
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2021
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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