When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2021
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| _version_ | 1866913455436464128 |
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| author | Yoon, Kiho |
| author_facet | Yoon, Kiho |
| contents | We study the problem of when to sell an indivisible object. There is a monopolistic seller who owns an indivisible object and plans to sell it over a given span of time to the set of potential buyers whose valuations for the object evolve over time. We formulate the seller's problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. We provide a procedure for finding the optimal solution and show how to check incentive compatibility. We also discuss the threshold rule from the perspective of optimal stopping. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2105_07649 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers Yoon, Kiho Theoretical Economics We study the problem of when to sell an indivisible object. There is a monopolistic seller who owns an indivisible object and plans to sell it over a given span of time to the set of potential buyers whose valuations for the object evolve over time. We formulate the seller's problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. We provide a procedure for finding the optimal solution and show how to check incentive compatibility. We also discuss the threshold rule from the perspective of optimal stopping. |
| title | When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.07649 |