Time-Efficient Algorithms for Nash-Bargaining-Based Matching Market Models
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | Panageas, Ioannis, Tröbst, Thorben, Vazirani, Vijay V. |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
Ejemplares similares
Matching Markets with Chores
por: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Fair Core Imputations for the Assignment Game: New Solution Concepts and Efficient Algorithms
por: Vazirani, Vijay V.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Vazirani, Vijay V.
Publicado: (2024)
Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability
por: Tröbst, Thorben, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Tröbst, Thorben, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Rational Convex Programs
por: Vazirani, Vijay V.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Vazirani, Vijay V.
Publicado: (2025)
A Generalization of von Neumann's Reduction from the Assignment Problem to Zero-Sum Games
por: Adler, Ilan, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Adler, Ilan, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Commitment, Conflict, and Status Quo in Bargaining
por: Pei, Harry
Publicado: (2025)
por: Pei, Harry
Publicado: (2025)
Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
por: Hartline, Jason
Publicado: (2026)
por: Hartline, Jason
Publicado: (2026)
Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets
por: Doval, Laura, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Doval, Laura, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Nash equilibria of quasisupermodular games
por: Yu, Lu
Publicado: (2024)
por: Yu, Lu
Publicado: (2024)
Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium
por: Seven, Mehmet Mars
Publicado: (2022)
por: Seven, Mehmet Mars
Publicado: (2022)
Distributed Interview Selection for Stable Matching in Large Random Markets
por: Cole, Richard, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Cole, Richard, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
por: Brandl, Florian, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
por: Brandl, Florian, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
A choice-based axiomatization of Nash equilibrium
por: Crescenzi, Michele
Publicado: (2025)
por: Crescenzi, Michele
Publicado: (2025)
Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets
por: Peng, Kenny, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Peng, Kenny, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
On Nash Equilibria in Play-Once and Terminal Deterministic Graphical Games
por: Boros, Endre, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Boros, Endre, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Properties of Path-Independent Choice Correspondences and Their Applications to Efficient and Stable Matchings
por: Bando, Keisuke, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Bando, Keisuke, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Preplay Losing Contracts: Inducing Strong Nash Equilibrium in the $n$-player Prisoner's Dilemma
por: Fligler, Ian
Publicado: (2026)
por: Fligler, Ian
Publicado: (2026)
Automated Market Making for Energy Sharing
por: Fabi, Michele, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Fabi, Michele, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Fine-Tuning Games: Bargaining and Adaptation for General-Purpose Models
por: Laufer, Benjamin, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
por: Laufer, Benjamin, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
Two-Sided Time-Independent Regret for Matching Markets with Limited Interviews
por: Mirfakhar, Amirmahdi, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Mirfakhar, Amirmahdi, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
Fragile Stable Matchings
por: Rudov, Kirill
Publicado: (2024)
por: Rudov, Kirill
Publicado: (2024)
Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions
por: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
A Directed Lazy Random Walk Model to Three-Way Dynamic Matching Problem
por: Roy, Souvik, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Roy, Souvik, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Algorithmic Collusion is Algorithm Orchestration
por: Carissimo, Cesare, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Carissimo, Cesare, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices
por: Thomas, Clayton
Publicado: (2024)
por: Thomas, Clayton
Publicado: (2024)
Anonymous Pricing in Large Markets
por: Jin, Yaonan, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Jin, Yaonan, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets
por: Goktas, Denizalp, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
por: Goktas, Denizalp, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
Assignment Markets with Budget Constraints
por: Batziou, Eleni, et al.
Publicado: (2022)
por: Batziou, Eleni, et al.
Publicado: (2022)
On Three-Layer Data Markets
por: Fallah, Alireza, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Fallah, Alireza, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching
por: Igarashi, Ayumi, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Igarashi, Ayumi, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets
por: Che, Yeon-Koo, et al.
Publicado: (2020)
por: Che, Yeon-Koo, et al.
Publicado: (2020)
Tit-for-Tat Dynamics and Market Volatility
por: Brânzei, Simina
Publicado: (2019)
por: Brânzei, Simina
Publicado: (2019)
Market Design for Capacity Sharing in Networks
por: Amin, Saurabh, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
por: Amin, Saurabh, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions
por: Highsmith, Terence
Publicado: (2024)
por: Highsmith, Terence
Publicado: (2024)
Matching, Unanticipated Experiences, Divorce, Flirting, Rematching, Etc
por: Schipper, Burkhard C., et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Schipper, Burkhard C., et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Automated Market Making for Goods with Perishable Utility
por: Zang, Chengqi, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Zang, Chengqi, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Proportional Response Dynamics in Gross Substitutes Markets
por: Cheung, Yun Kuen, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Cheung, Yun Kuen, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes
por: Srinivasan, Siddarth, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
por: Srinivasan, Siddarth, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
Optimal Algorithms for Bandit Learning in Matching Markets
por: Pagare, Tejas, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Pagare, Tejas, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Federated Learning and Free-riding in a Competitive Market
por: Meng, Jiajun, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Meng, Jiajun, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Ejemplares similares
-
Matching Markets with Chores
por: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Publicado: (2024) -
Fair Core Imputations for the Assignment Game: New Solution Concepts and Efficient Algorithms
por: Vazirani, Vijay V.
Publicado: (2024) -
Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability
por: Tröbst, Thorben, et al.
Publicado: (2024) -
Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Rational Convex Programs
por: Vazirani, Vijay V.
Publicado: (2025) -
A Generalization of von Neumann's Reduction from the Assignment Problem to Zero-Sum Games
por: Adler, Ilan, et al.
Publicado: (2024)