Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2021
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| _version_ | 1866909307621081088 |
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| author | Yoon, Kiho |
| author_facet | Yoon, Kiho |
| contents | This paper introduces dynamic mechanism design in an elementary fashion. We first examine optimal dynamic mechanisms: We find necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and formulate the optimal dynamic mechanism problem. We next examine efficient dynamic mechanisms: We establish the uniqueness of Groves mechanism and investigate budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism in some detail for a bilateral trading environment. This introduction reveals that many results and techniques of static mechanism design can be straightforwardly extended and adapted to the analysis of dynamic settings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2106_04850 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction Yoon, Kiho Theoretical Economics This paper introduces dynamic mechanism design in an elementary fashion. We first examine optimal dynamic mechanisms: We find necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and formulate the optimal dynamic mechanism problem. We next examine efficient dynamic mechanisms: We establish the uniqueness of Groves mechanism and investigate budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism in some detail for a bilateral trading environment. This introduction reveals that many results and techniques of static mechanism design can be straightforwardly extended and adapted to the analysis of dynamic settings. |
| title | Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.04850 |