Feedback Nash Equilibria in Differential Games with Impulse Control

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Sadana, Utsav, Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha, Zaccour, Georges
Format: Preprint
Published: 2021
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author Sadana, Utsav
Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha
Zaccour, Georges
author_facet Sadana, Utsav
Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha
Zaccour, Georges
contents We study a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where players are endowed with different kinds of controls. We assume that Player 1 uses piecewise-continuous controls, while Player 2 uses impulse controls. For this class of games, we seek to derive conditions for the existence of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for the players. More specifically, we provide a verification theorem for identifying such equilibrium strategies, using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for Player 1 and the quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) for Player 2. Further, we show that the equilibrium number of interventions by Player 2 is upper bounded. Furthermore, we specialize the obtained results to a scalar two-player linear-quadratic differential game. In this game, Player 1's objective is to drive the state variable towards a specific target value, and Player 2 has a similar objective with a different target value. We provide, for the first time, an analytical characterization of the feedback Nash equilibrium in a linear-quadratic differential game with impulse control. We illustrate our results using numerical experiments.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2106_10706
institution arXiv
publishDate 2021
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Feedback Nash Equilibria in Differential Games with Impulse Control
Sadana, Utsav
Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha
Zaccour, Georges
Optimization and Control
Systems and Control
We study a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where players are endowed with different kinds of controls. We assume that Player 1 uses piecewise-continuous controls, while Player 2 uses impulse controls. For this class of games, we seek to derive conditions for the existence of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for the players. More specifically, we provide a verification theorem for identifying such equilibrium strategies, using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for Player 1 and the quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) for Player 2. Further, we show that the equilibrium number of interventions by Player 2 is upper bounded. Furthermore, we specialize the obtained results to a scalar two-player linear-quadratic differential game. In this game, Player 1's objective is to drive the state variable towards a specific target value, and Player 2 has a similar objective with a different target value. We provide, for the first time, an analytical characterization of the feedback Nash equilibrium in a linear-quadratic differential game with impulse control. We illustrate our results using numerical experiments.
title Feedback Nash Equilibria in Differential Games with Impulse Control
topic Optimization and Control
Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.10706