Copertina

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Fan, Zhou, Marmolejo-Cossío, Francisco, Moroz, Daniel J., Neuder, Michael, Rao, Rithvik, Parkes, David C.
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2021
Soggetti:	Cryptography and Security Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Aggiungi Tag Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!

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