Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2021
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14456 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866910402785312768 |
|---|---|
| author | Chen, Yajing Jiao, Zhenhua Zhang, Chenfeng Zhang, Luosai |
| author_facet | Chen, Yajing Jiao, Zhenhua Zhang, Chenfeng Zhang, Luosai |
| contents | This paper studies the housing market problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We probe the Machiavellian frontier of the well-known top trading cycles (TTC) rule by weakening strategy-proofness and providing new characterizations for this rule. Specifically, our contribution lies in three aspects. First, we weaken the concept of strategy-proofness and introduce a new incentive notion called truncation-invariance, where the truthful preference-reporting assignment cannot be altered by any agent through misreporting a truncation of the true preference at the assignment produced by the true preference unilaterally. Second, we characterize the TTC rule by the following three groups of axioms: individual rationality, pair-efficiency, truncation-invariance; individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, truncation-invariance; individual rationality, endowments-swapping-proofness, truncation-invariance.1 The new characterizations refine several previous results.2 Third, we show through examples that the characterization results of Takamiya (2001) and Miyagawa (2002) can no longer be obtained if strategy-proofness is replaced with truncation-invariance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2106_14456 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Machiavellian frontier of top trading cycles Chen, Yajing Jiao, Zhenhua Zhang, Chenfeng Zhang, Luosai Theoretical Economics This paper studies the housing market problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We probe the Machiavellian frontier of the well-known top trading cycles (TTC) rule by weakening strategy-proofness and providing new characterizations for this rule. Specifically, our contribution lies in three aspects. First, we weaken the concept of strategy-proofness and introduce a new incentive notion called truncation-invariance, where the truthful preference-reporting assignment cannot be altered by any agent through misreporting a truncation of the true preference at the assignment produced by the true preference unilaterally. Second, we characterize the TTC rule by the following three groups of axioms: individual rationality, pair-efficiency, truncation-invariance; individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, truncation-invariance; individual rationality, endowments-swapping-proofness, truncation-invariance.1 The new characterizations refine several previous results.2 Third, we show through examples that the characterization results of Takamiya (2001) and Miyagawa (2002) can no longer be obtained if strategy-proofness is replaced with truncation-invariance. |
| title | The Machiavellian frontier of top trading cycles |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14456 |