BONUS! Maximizing Surprise

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Huang, Zhihuan, Kong, Yuqing, Liu, Tracy Xiao, Schoenebeck, Grant, Xu, Shengwei
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2021
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866914828305563648
author Huang, Zhihuan
Kong, Yuqing
Liu, Tracy Xiao
Schoenebeck, Grant
Xu, Shengwei
author_facet Huang, Zhihuan
Kong, Yuqing
Liu, Tracy Xiao
Schoenebeck, Grant
Xu, Shengwei
contents Multi-round competitions often double or triple the points awarded in the final round, calling it a bonus, to maximize spectators' excitement. In a two-player competition with $n$ rounds, we aim to derive the optimal bonus size to maximize the audience's overall expected surprise (as defined in [7]). We model the audience's prior belief over the two players' ability levels as a beta distribution. Using a novel analysis that clarifies and simplifies the computation, we find that the optimal bonus depends greatly upon the prior belief and obtain solutions of various forms for both the case of a finite number of rounds and the asymptotic case. In an interesting special case, we show that the optimal bonus approximately and asymptotically equals to the "expected lead", the number of points the weaker player will need to come back in expectation. Moreover, we observe that priors with a higher skewness lead to a higher optimal bonus size, and in the symmetric case, priors with a higher uncertainty also lead to a higher optimal bonus size. This matches our intuition since a highly asymmetric prior leads to a high "expected lead", and a highly uncertain symmetric prior often leads to a lopsided game, which again benefits from a larger bonus.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2107_08207
institution arXiv
publishDate 2021
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle BONUS! Maximizing Surprise
Huang, Zhihuan
Kong, Yuqing
Liu, Tracy Xiao
Schoenebeck, Grant
Xu, Shengwei
Computer Science and Game Theory
Multi-round competitions often double or triple the points awarded in the final round, calling it a bonus, to maximize spectators' excitement. In a two-player competition with $n$ rounds, we aim to derive the optimal bonus size to maximize the audience's overall expected surprise (as defined in [7]). We model the audience's prior belief over the two players' ability levels as a beta distribution. Using a novel analysis that clarifies and simplifies the computation, we find that the optimal bonus depends greatly upon the prior belief and obtain solutions of various forms for both the case of a finite number of rounds and the asymptotic case. In an interesting special case, we show that the optimal bonus approximately and asymptotically equals to the "expected lead", the number of points the weaker player will need to come back in expectation. Moreover, we observe that priors with a higher skewness lead to a higher optimal bonus size, and in the symmetric case, priors with a higher uncertainty also lead to a higher optimal bonus size. This matches our intuition since a highly asymmetric prior leads to a high "expected lead", and a highly uncertain symmetric prior often leads to a lopsided game, which again benefits from a larger bonus.
title BONUS! Maximizing Surprise
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.08207