Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2021
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| _version_ | 1866909946800504832 |
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| author | Elkind, Edith Ghosh, Abheek Goldberg, Paul W. |
| author_facet | Elkind, Edith Ghosh, Abheek Goldberg, Paul W. |
| contents | We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if the output of the player is very low or very high. We consider two variants of this setting, which correspond to two objective functions: binary threshold, where the designer's utility is a non-decreasing function of the number of players with output above a certain threshold; and linear threshold, where a player's contribution to the designer's utility is linear in her output if the output is between a lower and an upper threshold, and becomes constant below the lower and above the upper threshold. For both of these objectives, we study rank-order allocation contests and general contests. We characterize the contests that maximize the designer's objective and indicate techniques to efficiently compute them. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2109_03179 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Contest Design with Threshold Objectives Elkind, Edith Ghosh, Abheek Goldberg, Paul W. Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if the output of the player is very low or very high. We consider two variants of this setting, which correspond to two objective functions: binary threshold, where the designer's utility is a non-decreasing function of the number of players with output above a certain threshold; and linear threshold, where a player's contribution to the designer's utility is linear in her output if the output is between a lower and an upper threshold, and becomes constant below the lower and above the upper threshold. For both of these objectives, we study rank-order allocation contests and general contests. We characterize the contests that maximize the designer's objective and indicate techniques to efficiently compute them. |
| title | Contest Design with Threshold Objectives |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.03179 |