Nash Equilibrium Seeking for General Linear Systems with Disturbance Rejection
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866909365419638784 |
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| author | Cai, Xin Xiao, Feng Wei, Bo Yu, Mei Fang, Fang |
| author_facet | Cai, Xin Xiao, Feng Wei, Bo Yu, Mei Fang, Fang |
| contents | This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with perfect and imperfect information, respectively. Different from existing algorithms based on gradient dynamics, by introducing the integral of gradient of cost functions on the basis of passive theory, the rules are proposed to force the strategies of all players to evolve to Nash equilibrium regardless the effect of disturbances. The convergence of the two strategy-updating rules is analyzed via Lyapunov stability theory, passive theory and singular perturbation theory. Simulations are presented to verify the obtained results. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2110_08844 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Nash Equilibrium Seeking for General Linear Systems with Disturbance Rejection Cai, Xin Xiao, Feng Wei, Bo Yu, Mei Fang, Fang Optimization and Control 91A10, 93A14, 93A16, 93D50 This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with perfect and imperfect information, respectively. Different from existing algorithms based on gradient dynamics, by introducing the integral of gradient of cost functions on the basis of passive theory, the rules are proposed to force the strategies of all players to evolve to Nash equilibrium regardless the effect of disturbances. The convergence of the two strategy-updating rules is analyzed via Lyapunov stability theory, passive theory and singular perturbation theory. Simulations are presented to verify the obtained results. |
| title | Nash Equilibrium Seeking for General Linear Systems with Disturbance Rejection |
| topic | Optimization and Control 91A10, 93A14, 93A16, 93D50 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.08844 |