Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Caspari, Gian, Khanna, Manshu
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2021
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author Caspari, Gian
Khanna, Manshu
author_facet Caspari, Gian
Khanna, Manshu
contents We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2111_06815
institution arXiv
publishDate 2021
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets
Caspari, Gian
Khanna, Manshu
Theoretical Economics
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.
title Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.06815