Algorithm Design: A Fairness-Accuracy Frontier
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2021
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| _version_ | 1866929337852231680 |
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| author | Liang, Annie Lu, Jay Mu, Xiaosheng Okumura, Kyohei |
| author_facet | Liang, Annie Lu, Jay Mu, Xiaosheng Okumura, Kyohei |
| contents | Algorithm designers increasingly optimize not only for accuracy, but also for the fairness of the algorithm across pre-defined groups. We study the tradeoff between fairness and accuracy for any given set of inputs to the algorithm. We propose and characterize a fairness-accuracy frontier, which consists of the optimal points across a broad range of preferences over fairness and accuracy. Our results identify a simple property of the inputs, group-balance, which qualitatively determines the shape of the frontier. We further study an information-design problem where the designer flexibly regulates the inputs (e.g., by coarsening an input or banning its use) but the algorithm is chosen by another agent. Whether it is optimal to ban an input generally depends on the designer's preferences. But when inputs are group-balanced, then excluding group identity is strictly suboptimal for all designers, and when the designer has access to group identity, then it is strictly suboptimal to exclude any informative input. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2112_09975 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Algorithm Design: A Fairness-Accuracy Frontier Liang, Annie Lu, Jay Mu, Xiaosheng Okumura, Kyohei Theoretical Economics Algorithm designers increasingly optimize not only for accuracy, but also for the fairness of the algorithm across pre-defined groups. We study the tradeoff between fairness and accuracy for any given set of inputs to the algorithm. We propose and characterize a fairness-accuracy frontier, which consists of the optimal points across a broad range of preferences over fairness and accuracy. Our results identify a simple property of the inputs, group-balance, which qualitatively determines the shape of the frontier. We further study an information-design problem where the designer flexibly regulates the inputs (e.g., by coarsening an input or banning its use) but the algorithm is chosen by another agent. Whether it is optimal to ban an input generally depends on the designer's preferences. But when inputs are group-balanced, then excluding group identity is strictly suboptimal for all designers, and when the designer has access to group identity, then it is strictly suboptimal to exclude any informative input. |
| title | Algorithm Design: A Fairness-Accuracy Frontier |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.09975 |