When Is It Acceptable to Break the Rules? Knowledge Representation of Moral Judgement Based on Empirical Data

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Awad, Edmond, Levine, Sydney, Loreggia, Andrea, Mattei, Nicholas, Rahwan, Iyad, Rossi, Francesca, Talamadupula, Kartik, Tenenbaum, Joshua, Kleiman-Weiner, Max
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2022
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author Awad, Edmond
Levine, Sydney
Loreggia, Andrea
Mattei, Nicholas
Rahwan, Iyad
Rossi, Francesca
Talamadupula, Kartik
Tenenbaum, Joshua
Kleiman-Weiner, Max
author_facet Awad, Edmond
Levine, Sydney
Loreggia, Andrea
Mattei, Nicholas
Rahwan, Iyad
Rossi, Francesca
Talamadupula, Kartik
Tenenbaum, Joshua
Kleiman-Weiner, Max
contents One of the most remarkable things about the human moral mind is its flexibility. We can make moral judgments about cases we have never seen before. We can decide that pre-established rules should be broken. We can invent novel rules on the fly. Capturing this flexibility is one of the central challenges in developing AI systems that can interpret and produce human-like moral judgment. This paper details the results of a study of real-world decision makers who judge whether it is acceptable to break a well-established norm: ``no cutting in line.'' We gather data on how human participants judge the acceptability of line-cutting in a range of scenarios. Then, in order to effectively embed these reasoning capabilities into a machine, we propose a method for modeling them using a preference-based structure, which captures a novel modification to standard ``dual process'' theories of moral judgment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2201_07763
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle When Is It Acceptable to Break the Rules? Knowledge Representation of Moral Judgement Based on Empirical Data
Awad, Edmond
Levine, Sydney
Loreggia, Andrea
Mattei, Nicholas
Rahwan, Iyad
Rossi, Francesca
Talamadupula, Kartik
Tenenbaum, Joshua
Kleiman-Weiner, Max
Artificial Intelligence
Computers and Society
One of the most remarkable things about the human moral mind is its flexibility. We can make moral judgments about cases we have never seen before. We can decide that pre-established rules should be broken. We can invent novel rules on the fly. Capturing this flexibility is one of the central challenges in developing AI systems that can interpret and produce human-like moral judgment. This paper details the results of a study of real-world decision makers who judge whether it is acceptable to break a well-established norm: ``no cutting in line.'' We gather data on how human participants judge the acceptability of line-cutting in a range of scenarios. Then, in order to effectively embed these reasoning capabilities into a machine, we propose a method for modeling them using a preference-based structure, which captures a novel modification to standard ``dual process'' theories of moral judgment.
title When Is It Acceptable to Break the Rules? Knowledge Representation of Moral Judgement Based on Empirical Data
topic Artificial Intelligence
Computers and Society
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.07763