Imperceptible and Multi-channel Backdoor Attack against Deep Neural Networks

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Hauptverfasser: Xue, Mingfu, Ni, Shifeng, Wu, Yinghao, Zhang, Yushu, Wang, Jian, Liu, Weiqiang
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2022
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author Xue, Mingfu
Ni, Shifeng
Wu, Yinghao
Zhang, Yushu
Wang, Jian
Liu, Weiqiang
author_facet Xue, Mingfu
Ni, Shifeng
Wu, Yinghao
Zhang, Yushu
Wang, Jian
Liu, Weiqiang
contents Recent researches demonstrate that Deep Neural Networks (DNN) models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The backdoored DNN model will behave maliciously when images containing backdoor triggers arrive. To date, existing backdoor attacks are single-trigger and single-target attacks, and the triggers of most existing backdoor attacks are obvious thus are easy to be detected or noticed. In this paper, we propose a novel imperceptible and multi-channel backdoor attack against Deep Neural Networks by exploiting Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) steganography. Based on the proposed backdoor attack method, we implement two variants of backdoor attacks, i.e., N-to-N backdoor attack and N-to-One backdoor attack. Specifically, for a colored image, we utilize DCT steganography to construct the trigger on different channels of the image. As a result, the trigger is stealthy and natural. Based on the proposed method, we implement multi-target and multi-trigger backdoor attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that the average attack success rate of the N-to-N backdoor attack is 93.95% on CIFAR-10 dataset and 91.55% on TinyImageNet dataset, respectively. The average attack success rate of N-to-One attack is 90.22% and 89.53% on CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet datasets, respectively. Meanwhile, the proposed backdoor attack does not affect the classification accuracy of the DNN model. Moreover, the proposed attack is demonstrated to be robust to the state-of-the-art backdoor defense (Neural Cleanse).
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2201_13164
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Imperceptible and Multi-channel Backdoor Attack against Deep Neural Networks
Xue, Mingfu
Ni, Shifeng
Wu, Yinghao
Zhang, Yushu
Wang, Jian
Liu, Weiqiang
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Recent researches demonstrate that Deep Neural Networks (DNN) models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The backdoored DNN model will behave maliciously when images containing backdoor triggers arrive. To date, existing backdoor attacks are single-trigger and single-target attacks, and the triggers of most existing backdoor attacks are obvious thus are easy to be detected or noticed. In this paper, we propose a novel imperceptible and multi-channel backdoor attack against Deep Neural Networks by exploiting Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) steganography. Based on the proposed backdoor attack method, we implement two variants of backdoor attacks, i.e., N-to-N backdoor attack and N-to-One backdoor attack. Specifically, for a colored image, we utilize DCT steganography to construct the trigger on different channels of the image. As a result, the trigger is stealthy and natural. Based on the proposed method, we implement multi-target and multi-trigger backdoor attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that the average attack success rate of the N-to-N backdoor attack is 93.95% on CIFAR-10 dataset and 91.55% on TinyImageNet dataset, respectively. The average attack success rate of N-to-One attack is 90.22% and 89.53% on CIFAR-10 and TinyImageNet datasets, respectively. Meanwhile, the proposed backdoor attack does not affect the classification accuracy of the DNN model. Moreover, the proposed attack is demonstrated to be robust to the state-of-the-art backdoor defense (Neural Cleanse).
title Imperceptible and Multi-channel Backdoor Attack against Deep Neural Networks
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.13164