Team Belief DAG: Generalizing the Sequence Form to Team Games for Fast Computation of Correlated Team Max-Min Equilibria via Regret Minimization

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Zhang, Brian Hu, Farina, Gabriele, Sandholm, Tuomas
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2022
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author Zhang, Brian Hu
Farina, Gabriele
Sandholm, Tuomas
author_facet Zhang, Brian Hu
Farina, Gabriele
Sandholm, Tuomas
contents A classic result in the theory of extensive-form games asserts that the set of strategies available to any perfect-recall player is strategically equivalent to a low-dimensional convex polytope, called the sequence-form polytope. Online convex optimization tools operating on this polytope are the current state-of-the-art for computing several notions of equilibria in games, and have been crucial in landmark applications of computational game theory. However, when optimizing over the joint strategy space of a team of players, one cannot use the sequence form to obtain a strategically-equivalent convex description of the strategy set of the team. In this paper, we provide new complexity results on the computation of optimal strategies for teams, and propose a new representation, coined team belief DAG (TB-DAG), that describes team strategies as a convex set. The TB-DAG enjoys state-of-the-art parameterized complexity bounds, while at the same time enjoying the advantages of efficient regret minimization techniques. We show that TB-DAG can be exponentially smaller and can be computed exponentially faster than all other known representations, and that the converse is never true. Experimentally, we show that the TB-DAG, when paired with learning techniques, yields state of the art on a wide variety of benchmark team games.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2202_00789
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Team Belief DAG: Generalizing the Sequence Form to Team Games for Fast Computation of Correlated Team Max-Min Equilibria via Regret Minimization
Zhang, Brian Hu
Farina, Gabriele
Sandholm, Tuomas
Computer Science and Game Theory
A classic result in the theory of extensive-form games asserts that the set of strategies available to any perfect-recall player is strategically equivalent to a low-dimensional convex polytope, called the sequence-form polytope. Online convex optimization tools operating on this polytope are the current state-of-the-art for computing several notions of equilibria in games, and have been crucial in landmark applications of computational game theory. However, when optimizing over the joint strategy space of a team of players, one cannot use the sequence form to obtain a strategically-equivalent convex description of the strategy set of the team. In this paper, we provide new complexity results on the computation of optimal strategies for teams, and propose a new representation, coined team belief DAG (TB-DAG), that describes team strategies as a convex set. The TB-DAG enjoys state-of-the-art parameterized complexity bounds, while at the same time enjoying the advantages of efficient regret minimization techniques. We show that TB-DAG can be exponentially smaller and can be computed exponentially faster than all other known representations, and that the converse is never true. Experimentally, we show that the TB-DAG, when paired with learning techniques, yields state of the art on a wide variety of benchmark team games.
title Team Belief DAG: Generalizing the Sequence Form to Team Games for Fast Computation of Correlated Team Max-Min Equilibria via Regret Minimization
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00789