Stable cooperation emerges in stochastic multiplicative growth
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866929596612476928 |
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| author | Fant, Lorenzo Mazzarisi, Onofrio Panizon, Emanuele Grilli, Jacopo |
| author_facet | Fant, Lorenzo Mazzarisi, Onofrio Panizon, Emanuele Grilli, Jacopo |
| contents | Understanding the evolutionary stability of cooperation is a central problem in biology, sociology, and economics. There exist only a few known mechanisms that guarantee the existence of cooperation and its robustness to cheating. Here, we introduce a new mechanism for the emergence of cooperation in the presence of fluctuations. We consider agents whose wealth change stochastically in a multiplicative fashion. Each agent can share part of her wealth as public good, which is equally distributed among all the agents. We show that, when agents operate with long time-horizons, cooperation produce an advantage at the individual level, as it effectively screens agents from the deleterious effect of environmental fluctuations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2202_02787 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stable cooperation emerges in stochastic multiplicative growth Fant, Lorenzo Mazzarisi, Onofrio Panizon, Emanuele Grilli, Jacopo Populations and Evolution Statistical Mechanics Theoretical Economics Biological Physics General Finance Understanding the evolutionary stability of cooperation is a central problem in biology, sociology, and economics. There exist only a few known mechanisms that guarantee the existence of cooperation and its robustness to cheating. Here, we introduce a new mechanism for the emergence of cooperation in the presence of fluctuations. We consider agents whose wealth change stochastically in a multiplicative fashion. Each agent can share part of her wealth as public good, which is equally distributed among all the agents. We show that, when agents operate with long time-horizons, cooperation produce an advantage at the individual level, as it effectively screens agents from the deleterious effect of environmental fluctuations. |
| title | Stable cooperation emerges in stochastic multiplicative growth |
| topic | Populations and Evolution Statistical Mechanics Theoretical Economics Biological Physics General Finance |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.02787 |