Selling Information in Competitive Environments
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2022
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| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866912119652352000 |
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| author | Bonatti, Alessandro Dahleh, Munther Horel, Thibaut Nouripour, Amir |
| author_facet | Bonatti, Alessandro Dahleh, Munther Horel, Thibaut Nouripour, Amir |
| contents | Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while eliciting the buyers' types and imposing payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of games with binary actions and states. Our results highlight the critical properties of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from buyer competition increase the profitability of recommending the correct action to one buyer exclusively; (ii) for the buyers to follow the seller's recommendations, the degree of exclusivity must be limited; (iii) the buyers' obedience constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information introduced by a monopolist seller; (iv) as competition becomes fiercer, these limitations become more severe, weakening the impact of market power on the allocation of information. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2202_08780 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Selling Information in Competitive Environments Bonatti, Alessandro Dahleh, Munther Horel, Thibaut Nouripour, Amir Computer Science and Game Theory Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while eliciting the buyers' types and imposing payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of games with binary actions and states. Our results highlight the critical properties of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from buyer competition increase the profitability of recommending the correct action to one buyer exclusively; (ii) for the buyers to follow the seller's recommendations, the degree of exclusivity must be limited; (iii) the buyers' obedience constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information introduced by a monopolist seller; (iv) as competition becomes fiercer, these limitations become more severe, weakening the impact of market power on the allocation of information. |
| title | Selling Information in Competitive Environments |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.08780 |