Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866912057589235712 |
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| author | Mishra, Debasis Paramahamsa, Kolagani |
| author_facet | Mishra, Debasis Paramahamsa, Kolagani |
| contents | We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained while the principal is not. The agent participates in the mechanism, but she can (strategically) delegate decision-making to the principal. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism in a two-dimensional type space (values of the agent and the principal). We show that below a threshold budget, a mechanism involving two posted prices and three outcomes (one of which involves randomization) is the optimal mechanism for the seller. Otherwise, a single posted price mechanism is optimal. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2202_10378 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent Mishra, Debasis Paramahamsa, Kolagani Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained while the principal is not. The agent participates in the mechanism, but she can (strategically) delegate decision-making to the principal. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism in a two-dimensional type space (values of the agent and the principal). We show that below a threshold budget, a mechanism involving two posted prices and three outcomes (one of which involves randomization) is the optimal mechanism for the seller. Otherwise, a single posted price mechanism is optimal. |
| title | Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10378 |