Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Levin, Dan, Zhang, Luyao
Format: Preprint
Published: 2022
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author Levin, Dan
Zhang, Luyao
author_facet Levin, Dan
Zhang, Luyao
contents We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data from five published papers on static, dynamic, and auction games. NLK provides different predictions than those of the NE and Level-K; moreover, a simple version of NLK explains the experimental data better in many cases, with the same or lower number of parameters. We discuss extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2202_12292
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
Levin, Dan
Zhang, Luyao
General Economics
Economics
Computer Science and Game Theory
Applications
Computation
J.4
We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data from five published papers on static, dynamic, and auction games. NLK provides different predictions than those of the NE and Level-K; moreover, a simple version of NLK explains the experimental data better in many cases, with the same or lower number of parameters. We discuss extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs.
title Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
topic General Economics
Economics
Computer Science and Game Theory
Applications
Computation
J.4
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.12292