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Speculation in Procurement Auctions

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Deng, Shanglyu
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2022
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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