Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version)
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866910327502798848 |
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| author | Brice, Léonard Bogaard, Marie van den Raskin, Jean-François |
| author_facet | Brice, Léonard Bogaard, Marie van den Raskin, Jean-François |
| contents | In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the literature, is decidable. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2203_08546 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version) Brice, Léonard Bogaard, Marie van den Raskin, Jean-François Computer Science and Game Theory In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the literature, is decidable. |
| title | Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version) |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.08546 |