Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866913342888607744 |
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| author | Otani, Suguru |
| author_facet | Otani, Suguru |
| contents | As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents, transfers, and individual rationality conditions with sufficiently large penalty terms makes it possible to identify the coefficient parameter of a single common constant, i.e., matching costs in the market. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2204_00713 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games Otani, Suguru General Economics Economics As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents, transfers, and individual rationality conditions with sufficiently large penalty terms makes it possible to identify the coefficient parameter of a single common constant, i.e., matching costs in the market. |
| title | Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.00713 |