Clues in Tweets: Twitter-Guided Discovery and Analysis of SMS Spam

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Tang, Siyuan, Mi, Xianghang, Li, Ying, Wang, XiaoFeng, Chen, Kai
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2022
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author Tang, Siyuan
Mi, Xianghang
Li, Ying
Wang, XiaoFeng
Chen, Kai
author_facet Tang, Siyuan
Mi, Xianghang
Li, Ying
Wang, XiaoFeng
Chen, Kai
contents With its critical role in business and service delivery through mobile devices, SMS (Short Message Service) has long been abused for spamming, which is still on the rise today possibly due to the emergence of A2P bulk messaging. The effort to control SMS spam has been hampered by the lack of up-to-date information about illicit activities. In our research, we proposed a novel solution to collect recent SMS spam data, at a large scale, from Twitter, where users voluntarily report the spam messages they receive. For this purpose, we designed and implemented SpamHunter, an automated pipeline to discover SMS spam reporting tweets and extract message content from the attached screenshots. Leveraging SpamHunter, we collected from Twitter a dataset of 21,918 SMS spam messages in 75 languages, spanning over four years. To our best knowledge, this is the largest SMS spam dataset ever made public. More importantly, SpamHunter enables us to continuously monitor emerging SMS spam messages, which facilitates the ongoing effort to mitigate SMS spamming. We also performed an in-depth measurement study that sheds light on the new trends in the spammer's strategies, infrastructure and spam campaigns. We also utilized our spam SMS data to evaluate the robustness of the spam countermeasures put in place by the SMS ecosystem, including anti-spam services, bulk SMS services, and text messaging apps. Our evaluation shows that such protection cannot effectively handle those spam samples: either introducing significant false positives or missing a large number of newly reported spam messages.
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publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Clues in Tweets: Twitter-Guided Discovery and Analysis of SMS Spam
Tang, Siyuan
Mi, Xianghang
Li, Ying
Wang, XiaoFeng
Chen, Kai
Cryptography and Security
With its critical role in business and service delivery through mobile devices, SMS (Short Message Service) has long been abused for spamming, which is still on the rise today possibly due to the emergence of A2P bulk messaging. The effort to control SMS spam has been hampered by the lack of up-to-date information about illicit activities. In our research, we proposed a novel solution to collect recent SMS spam data, at a large scale, from Twitter, where users voluntarily report the spam messages they receive. For this purpose, we designed and implemented SpamHunter, an automated pipeline to discover SMS spam reporting tweets and extract message content from the attached screenshots. Leveraging SpamHunter, we collected from Twitter a dataset of 21,918 SMS spam messages in 75 languages, spanning over four years. To our best knowledge, this is the largest SMS spam dataset ever made public. More importantly, SpamHunter enables us to continuously monitor emerging SMS spam messages, which facilitates the ongoing effort to mitigate SMS spamming. We also performed an in-depth measurement study that sheds light on the new trends in the spammer's strategies, infrastructure and spam campaigns. We also utilized our spam SMS data to evaluate the robustness of the spam countermeasures put in place by the SMS ecosystem, including anti-spam services, bulk SMS services, and text messaging apps. Our evaluation shows that such protection cannot effectively handle those spam samples: either introducing significant false positives or missing a large number of newly reported spam messages.
title Clues in Tweets: Twitter-Guided Discovery and Analysis of SMS Spam
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.01233