Adversarial Analysis of the Differentially-Private Federated Learning in Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructures

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Hossain, Md Tamjid, Badsha, Shahriar, La, Hung, Shen, Haoting, Islam, Shafkat, Khalil, Ibrahim, Yi, Xun
Format: Preprint
Published: 2022
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author Hossain, Md Tamjid
Badsha, Shahriar
La, Hung
Shen, Haoting
Islam, Shafkat
Khalil, Ibrahim
Yi, Xun
author_facet Hossain, Md Tamjid
Badsha, Shahriar
La, Hung
Shen, Haoting
Islam, Shafkat
Khalil, Ibrahim
Yi, Xun
contents Federated Learning (FL) has become increasingly popular to perform data-driven analysis in cyber-physical critical infrastructures. Since the FL process may involve the client's confidential information, Differential Privacy (DP) has been proposed lately to secure it from adversarial inference. However, we find that while DP greatly alleviates the privacy concerns, the additional DP-noise opens a new threat for model poisoning in FL. Nonetheless, very little effort has been made in the literature to investigate this adversarial exploitation of the DP-noise. To overcome this gap, in this paper, we present a novel adaptive model poisoning technique α-MPELM} through which an attacker can exploit the additional DP-noise to evade the state-of-the-art anomaly detection techniques and prevent optimal convergence of the FL model. We evaluate our proposed attack on the state-of-the-art anomaly detection approaches in terms of detection accuracy and validation loss. The main significance of our proposed α-MPELM attack is that it reduces the state-of-the-art anomaly detection accuracy by 6.8% for norm detection, 12.6% for accuracy detection, and 13.8% for mix detection. Furthermore, we propose a Reinforcement Learning-based DP level selection process to defend α-MPELM attack. The experimental results confirm that our defense mechanism converges to an optimal privacy policy without human maneuver.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2204_02654
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Adversarial Analysis of the Differentially-Private Federated Learning in Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructures
Hossain, Md Tamjid
Badsha, Shahriar
La, Hung
Shen, Haoting
Islam, Shafkat
Khalil, Ibrahim
Yi, Xun
Cryptography and Security
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Federated Learning (FL) has become increasingly popular to perform data-driven analysis in cyber-physical critical infrastructures. Since the FL process may involve the client's confidential information, Differential Privacy (DP) has been proposed lately to secure it from adversarial inference. However, we find that while DP greatly alleviates the privacy concerns, the additional DP-noise opens a new threat for model poisoning in FL. Nonetheless, very little effort has been made in the literature to investigate this adversarial exploitation of the DP-noise. To overcome this gap, in this paper, we present a novel adaptive model poisoning technique α-MPELM} through which an attacker can exploit the additional DP-noise to evade the state-of-the-art anomaly detection techniques and prevent optimal convergence of the FL model. We evaluate our proposed attack on the state-of-the-art anomaly detection approaches in terms of detection accuracy and validation loss. The main significance of our proposed α-MPELM attack is that it reduces the state-of-the-art anomaly detection accuracy by 6.8% for norm detection, 12.6% for accuracy detection, and 13.8% for mix detection. Furthermore, we propose a Reinforcement Learning-based DP level selection process to defend α-MPELM attack. The experimental results confirm that our defense mechanism converges to an optimal privacy policy without human maneuver.
title Adversarial Analysis of the Differentially-Private Federated Learning in Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructures
topic Cryptography and Security
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.02654