Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2022
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866909455218638848 |
|---|---|
| author | Shen, Lijiong Kurtsiefer, Christian |
| author_facet | Shen, Lijiong Kurtsiefer, Christian |
| contents | In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been addressed both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their inner working, and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector, but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2204_06155 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing Shen, Lijiong Kurtsiefer, Christian Quantum Physics In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns, and has been addressed both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their inner working, and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector, but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector. |
| title | Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.06155 |