Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910110532501504 |
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| author | Coreno, Jacob Balbuzanov, Ivan |
| author_facet | Coreno, Jacob Balbuzanov, Ivan |
| contents | Drafts are sequential round-robin allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues). Agents report ordinal preferences over objects and bundles are partially ordered by pairwise comparison. We provide a simple characterization of draft rules: they are the only allocation rules that are respectful of a priority (RP), envy-free up to one object (EF1), non-wasteful (NW), and resource monotonic (RM). RP and EF1 are crucial for competitive balance in sports leagues. We also prove two related impossibility theorems showing that the competitive-balance axioms RP and EF1 are generally incompatible with strategy-proofness. Nevertheless, draft rules satisfy maxmin strategy-proofness. If agents may declare some objects unacceptable, then draft rules are characterized by RP, EF1, NW, and RM, in conjunction with individual rationality and truncation invariance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2204_08300 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules Coreno, Jacob Balbuzanov, Ivan Theoretical Economics Drafts are sequential round-robin allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues). Agents report ordinal preferences over objects and bundles are partially ordered by pairwise comparison. We provide a simple characterization of draft rules: they are the only allocation rules that are respectful of a priority (RP), envy-free up to one object (EF1), non-wasteful (NW), and resource monotonic (RM). RP and EF1 are crucial for competitive balance in sports leagues. We also prove two related impossibility theorems showing that the competitive-balance axioms RP and EF1 are generally incompatible with strategy-proofness. Nevertheless, draft rules satisfy maxmin strategy-proofness. If agents may declare some objects unacceptable, then draft rules are characterized by RP, EF1, NW, and RM, in conjunction with individual rationality and truncation invariance. |
| title | Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.08300 |