Optimal Utility Design of Greedy Algorithms in Resource Allocation Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Konda, Rohit, Chandan, Rahul, Grimsman, David, Marden, Jason R.
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2022
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author Konda, Rohit
Chandan, Rahul
Grimsman, David
Marden, Jason R.
author_facet Konda, Rohit
Chandan, Rahul
Grimsman, David
Marden, Jason R.
contents Designing distributed algorithms for multi-agent problems is vital for many emerging application domains, and game-theoretic approaches are emerging as a useful paradigm to design such algorithms. However, much of the emphasis of the game-theoretic approach is on the study of equilibrium behavior, whereas transient behavior is often less explored. Therefore, in this paper we study the transient efficiency guarantees of best response processes in the context of resource-allocation games, which are used to model a variety of engineering applications. Specifically, the main focus of the paper is on designing utility functions of agents to induce optimal short-term system-level behavior under a best-response process. Interestingly, the resulting transient performance guarantees are relatively close to the optimal asymptotic performance guarantees. Furthermore, we characterize a trade-off that results when optimizing for both asymptotic and transient efficiency through various utility designs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2204_10364
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Optimal Utility Design of Greedy Algorithms in Resource Allocation Games
Konda, Rohit
Chandan, Rahul
Grimsman, David
Marden, Jason R.
Systems and Control
Designing distributed algorithms for multi-agent problems is vital for many emerging application domains, and game-theoretic approaches are emerging as a useful paradigm to design such algorithms. However, much of the emphasis of the game-theoretic approach is on the study of equilibrium behavior, whereas transient behavior is often less explored. Therefore, in this paper we study the transient efficiency guarantees of best response processes in the context of resource-allocation games, which are used to model a variety of engineering applications. Specifically, the main focus of the paper is on designing utility functions of agents to induce optimal short-term system-level behavior under a best-response process. Interestingly, the resulting transient performance guarantees are relatively close to the optimal asymptotic performance guarantees. Furthermore, we characterize a trade-off that results when optimizing for both asymptotic and transient efficiency through various utility designs.
title Optimal Utility Design of Greedy Algorithms in Resource Allocation Games
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.10364