Bankrupting DoS Attackers
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866914296588402688 |
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| author | Chakraborty, Trisha Islam, Abir King, Valerie Rayborn, Daniel Saia, Jared Young, Maxwell |
| author_facet | Chakraborty, Trisha Islam, Abir King, Valerie Rayborn, Daniel Saia, Jared Young, Maxwell |
| contents | Can we make a denial-of-service attacker pay more than the server and honest clients? Consider a model where a server sees a stream of jobs sent by either honest clients or an adversary. The server sets a price for servicing each job with the aid of an estimator, which provides approximate statistical information about the distribution of previously occurring good jobs.
We describe and analyze pricing algorithms for the server under different models of synchrony, with total cost parameterized by the accuracy of the estimator. Given a reasonably accurate estimator, the algorithm's cost provably grows more slowly than the attacker's cost, as the attacker's cost grows large. Additionally, we prove a lower bound, showing that our pricing algorithm yields asymptotically tight results when the estimator is accurate within constant factors. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2205_08287 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Bankrupting DoS Attackers Chakraborty, Trisha Islam, Abir King, Valerie Rayborn, Daniel Saia, Jared Young, Maxwell Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Data Structures and Algorithms Can we make a denial-of-service attacker pay more than the server and honest clients? Consider a model where a server sees a stream of jobs sent by either honest clients or an adversary. The server sets a price for servicing each job with the aid of an estimator, which provides approximate statistical information about the distribution of previously occurring good jobs. We describe and analyze pricing algorithms for the server under different models of synchrony, with total cost parameterized by the accuracy of the estimator. Given a reasonably accurate estimator, the algorithm's cost provably grows more slowly than the attacker's cost, as the attacker's cost grows large. Additionally, we prove a lower bound, showing that our pricing algorithm yields asymptotically tight results when the estimator is accurate within constant factors. |
| title | Bankrupting DoS Attackers |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Data Structures and Algorithms |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.08287 |