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A General Framework for a Class of Quarrels: The Quarrelling Paradox Revisited

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Abizadeh, Arash, Vetta, Adrian
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2022
Materias:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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