Imagen de Portada

Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Gaitonde, Jason, Li, Yingkai, Light, Bar, Lucier, Brendan, Slivkins, Aleksandrs
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2022
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

Autobidders with Budget and ROI Constraints: Efficiency, Regret, and Pacing Dynamics
por: Lucier, Brendan, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Exploration and Incentivizing Participation in Randomized Trials
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulation
por: Harris, Keegan, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Impact of Decentralized Learning on Player Utilities in Stackelberg Games
por: Donahue, Kate, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Equilibria in Repeated Games under No-Regret with Dynamic Benchmarks
por: Crippa, Ludovico, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Adaptive Discretization against an Adversary: Lipschitz bandits, Dynamic Pricing, and Auction Tuning
por: Podimata, Chara, et al.
Publicado: (2020)

Exploration and Persuasion
por: Slivkins, Aleksandrs
Publicado: (2024)

Bandit Social Learning with Exploration Episodes
por: Banihashem, Kiarash, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Scale-robust Auctions
por: Hartline, Jason, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions
por: Fikioris, Giannis, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Agentic Markets: Equilibrium Effects of Improving Consumer Search
por: Lucier, Brendan, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Robust and Performance Incentivizing Algorithms for Multi-Armed Bandits with Strategic Agents
por: Esmaeili, Seyed A., et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Conjectural Variations in Competitive Dynamic Pricing: A Learning Foundation via Experimentation Design and Feedback Structure
por: Light, Bar, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints
por: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers
por: Lucier, Brendan, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints
por: Liaw, Christopher, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

From No-Regret to Strategically Robust Learning in Repeated Auctions
por: Zhao, Junyao
Publicado: (2026)

Optimal Selection Using Algorithmic Rankings with Side Information
por: Donahue, Kate, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
por: Cai, Yang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Repeated Descent: A Framework for Online Budget-Feasible Auctions
por: Charalampopoulos, Andreas, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Computing and Learning Stationary Mean Field Equilibria with Scalar Interactions: Algorithms and Applications
por: Light, Bar
Publicado: (2025)

Pacing Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions with Few Goods
por: Huang, Yiyang, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price Auctions
por: Deng, Yuan, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples
por: Dütting, Paul, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Constant Inapproximability of Pacing Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions
por: Chen, Xi, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities on Budgets
por: Zheng, Yusen, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions
por: Fikioris, Giannis, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Robust Temporal Guarantees in Budgeted Sequential Auctions
por: Fikioris, Giannis, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors
por: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competition
por: Aridor, Guy, et al.
Publicado: (2020)

A Practical Guide to Budget Pacing Algorithms in Digital Advertising
por: Chen, Yuanlong
Publicado: (2025)

Applying Opponent Modeling for Automatic Bidding in Online Repeated Auctions
por: Hu, Yudong, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Welfare Maximization in Procurement Auctions
por: Cui, Shuang, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
por: Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Feedback Control for Small Budget Pacing
por: Apparaju, Sreeja, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Equilibria under Dynamic Benchmark Consistency in Non-Stationary Multi-Agent Systems
por: Crippa, Ludovico, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Eliciting Informed Preferences
por: Camara, Modibo K., et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Bandit Social Learning: Exploration under Myopic Behavior
por: Banihashem, Kiarash, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosure
por: Immorlica, Nicole, et al.
Publicado: (2018)

On the Convergence of Learning Algorithms in Bayesian Auction Games
por: Bichler, Martin, et al.
Publicado: (2023)