Zero-Sum Games and Linear Programming Duality

Fuente: arXiv
Enregistré dans:
Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: von Stengel, Bernhard
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2022
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:
Tags: Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
_version_ 1866915090795593728
author von Stengel, Bernhard
author_facet von Stengel, Bernhard
contents The minimax theorem for zero-sum games is easily proved from the strong duality theorem of linear programming. For the converse direction, the standard proof by Dantzig (1951) is known to be incomplete. We explain and combine classical theorems about solving linear equations with nonnegative variables to give a correct alternative proof, more directly than Adler (2013). We also extend Dantzig's game so that any max-min strategy gives either an optimal LP solution or shows that none exists.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2205_11196
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Zero-Sum Games and Linear Programming Duality
von Stengel, Bernhard
Computer Science and Game Theory
Optimization and Control
91A05, 90C05
G.2
The minimax theorem for zero-sum games is easily proved from the strong duality theorem of linear programming. For the converse direction, the standard proof by Dantzig (1951) is known to be incomplete. We explain and combine classical theorems about solving linear equations with nonnegative variables to give a correct alternative proof, more directly than Adler (2013). We also extend Dantzig's game so that any max-min strategy gives either an optimal LP solution or shows that none exists.
title Zero-Sum Games and Linear Programming Duality
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Optimization and Control
91A05, 90C05
G.2
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.11196