Communicating with Anecdotes
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866917725244227584 |
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| author | Haghtalab, Nika Immorlica, Nicole Lucier, Brendan Mobius, Markus Mohan, Divyarthi |
| author_facet | Haghtalab, Nika Immorlica, Nicole Lucier, Brendan Mobius, Markus Mohan, Divyarthi |
| contents | We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and the receiver both care about the state of the world but are also influenced by personal preferences, so their ideal actions can differ. We characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria. The sender faces a temptation to persuade: she wants to select a biased anecdote to influence the receiver's action. Anecdotes are still informative to the receiver (who will debias at equilibrium) but the attempt to persuade comes at a cost to precision. This gives rise to informational homophily where the receiver prefers to listen to like-minded senders because they provide higher-precision signals. Communication becomes polarized when the sender is an expert with access to many signals, with the sender choosing extreme outlier anecdotes at equilibrium (unless preferences are perfectly aligned). This polarization dissipates all gains from communication with an increasingly well-informed sender when the anecdote distribution is heavy-tailed. Experts can therefore face a curse of informedness: receivers will prefer to listen to less-informed senders who cannot pick biased signals as easily. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2205_13461 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Communicating with Anecdotes Haghtalab, Nika Immorlica, Nicole Lucier, Brendan Mobius, Markus Mohan, Divyarthi Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and the receiver both care about the state of the world but are also influenced by personal preferences, so their ideal actions can differ. We characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria. The sender faces a temptation to persuade: she wants to select a biased anecdote to influence the receiver's action. Anecdotes are still informative to the receiver (who will debias at equilibrium) but the attempt to persuade comes at a cost to precision. This gives rise to informational homophily where the receiver prefers to listen to like-minded senders because they provide higher-precision signals. Communication becomes polarized when the sender is an expert with access to many signals, with the sender choosing extreme outlier anecdotes at equilibrium (unless preferences are perfectly aligned). This polarization dissipates all gains from communication with an increasingly well-informed sender when the anecdote distribution is heavy-tailed. Experts can therefore face a curse of informedness: receivers will prefer to listen to less-informed senders who cannot pick biased signals as easily. |
| title | Communicating with Anecdotes |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13461 |