Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866912466516049920 |
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| author | Ikegami, Kei Iwasaki, Atsushi Matsushita, Akira Okumura, Kyohei |
| author_facet | Ikegami, Kei Iwasaki, Atsushi Matsushita, Akira Okumura, Kyohei |
| contents | Cap-based regulations are widely used to address distributional disparities in matching markets, but their efficiency relative to alternative instruments such as subsidies remains poorly understood. This paper develops a framework for evaluating policy interventions by incorporating regional constraints into a transferable utility matching model. We show that a policymaker with aggregate-level match data can implement a taxation policy that maximizes social welfare and outperforms any cap-based policy. Using newly collected data from the Japan Residency Matching Program, we estimate participant preferences and simulate counterfactual match outcomes under both cap-based and subsidy-based policies. The results reveal that the status quo cap-based regulation generates substantial efficiency losses, whereas small, targeted subsidies can achieve similar distributional goals with significantly higher social welfare. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2205_14387 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities Ikegami, Kei Iwasaki, Atsushi Matsushita, Akira Okumura, Kyohei Computer Science and Game Theory General Economics Economics Cap-based regulations are widely used to address distributional disparities in matching markets, but their efficiency relative to alternative instruments such as subsidies remains poorly understood. This paper develops a framework for evaluating policy interventions by incorporating regional constraints into a transferable utility matching model. We show that a policymaker with aggregate-level match data can implement a taxation policy that maximizes social welfare and outperforms any cap-based policy. Using newly collected data from the Japan Residency Matching Program, we estimate participant preferences and simulate counterfactual match outcomes under both cap-based and subsidy-based policies. The results reveal that the status quo cap-based regulation generates substantial efficiency losses, whereas small, targeted subsidies can achieve similar distributional goals with significantly higher social welfare. |
| title | Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14387 |