New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Caragiannis, Ioannis, Garg, Jugal, Rathi, Nidhi, Sharma, Eklavya, Varricchio, Giovanna
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2022
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author Caragiannis, Ioannis
Garg, Jugal
Rathi, Nidhi
Sharma, Eklavya
Varricchio, Giovanna
author_facet Caragiannis, Ioannis
Garg, Jugal
Rathi, Nidhi
Sharma, Eklavya
Varricchio, Giovanna
contents For the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents, envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and maximin fairness (MMS) are arguably the most compelling fairness concepts proposed until now. Unfortunately, despite significant efforts over the past few years, whether EFX allocations always exist is still an enigmatic open problem, let alone their efficient computation. Furthermore, today we know that MMS allocations are not always guaranteed to exist. These facts weaken the usefulness of both EFX and MMS, albeit their appealing conceptual characteristics. We propose two alternative fairness concepts, called epistemic EFX (EEFX) and minimum EFX share fairness (MXS), inspired by EFX and MMS. For both, we explore their relationships to well-studied fairness notions and, more importantly, prove that EEFX and MXS allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently for additive valuations. Our results justify that the new fairness concepts can be excellent alternatives to EFX and MMS.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_01710
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items
Caragiannis, Ioannis
Garg, Jugal
Rathi, Nidhi
Sharma, Eklavya
Varricchio, Giovanna
Computer Science and Game Theory
For the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents, envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and maximin fairness (MMS) are arguably the most compelling fairness concepts proposed until now. Unfortunately, despite significant efforts over the past few years, whether EFX allocations always exist is still an enigmatic open problem, let alone their efficient computation. Furthermore, today we know that MMS allocations are not always guaranteed to exist. These facts weaken the usefulness of both EFX and MMS, albeit their appealing conceptual characteristics. We propose two alternative fairness concepts, called epistemic EFX (EEFX) and minimum EFX share fairness (MXS), inspired by EFX and MMS. For both, we explore their relationships to well-studied fairness notions and, more importantly, prove that EEFX and MXS allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently for additive valuations. Our results justify that the new fairness concepts can be excellent alternatives to EFX and MMS.
title New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.01710