Universal Complexity Bounds Based on Value Iteration for Stochastic Mean Payoff Games and Entropy Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Allamigeon, Xavier, Gaubert, Stéphane, Katz, Ricardo D., Skomra, Mateusz
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2022
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author Allamigeon, Xavier
Gaubert, Stéphane
Katz, Ricardo D.
Skomra, Mateusz
author_facet Allamigeon, Xavier
Gaubert, Stéphane
Katz, Ricardo D.
Skomra, Mateusz
contents We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to a given precision. We show that the number of calls to the oracle needed to determine exact optimal (positional) strategies is, up to a factor polynomial in the dimension, of order R/sep, where the "separation" sep is defined as the minimal difference between distinct values arising from strategies, and R is a metric estimate, involving the norm of approximate sub and super-eigenvectors of the dynamic programming operator. We illustrate this method by two applications. The first one is a new proof, leading to improved complexity estimates, of a theorem of Boros, Elbassioni, Gurvich and Makino, showing that turn-based mean-payoff games with a fixed number of random positions can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time. The second one concerns entropy games, a model introduced by Asarin, Cervelle, Degorre, Dima, Horn and Kozyakin. The rank of an entropy game is defined as the maximal rank among all the ambiguity matrices determined by strategies of the two players. We show that entropy games with a fixed rank, in their original formulation, can be solved in polynomial time, and that an extension of entropy games incorporating weights can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time under the same fixed rank condition.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_09044
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Universal Complexity Bounds Based on Value Iteration for Stochastic Mean Payoff Games and Entropy Games
Allamigeon, Xavier
Gaubert, Stéphane
Katz, Ricardo D.
Skomra, Mateusz
Computer Science and Game Theory
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to a given precision. We show that the number of calls to the oracle needed to determine exact optimal (positional) strategies is, up to a factor polynomial in the dimension, of order R/sep, where the "separation" sep is defined as the minimal difference between distinct values arising from strategies, and R is a metric estimate, involving the norm of approximate sub and super-eigenvectors of the dynamic programming operator. We illustrate this method by two applications. The first one is a new proof, leading to improved complexity estimates, of a theorem of Boros, Elbassioni, Gurvich and Makino, showing that turn-based mean-payoff games with a fixed number of random positions can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time. The second one concerns entropy games, a model introduced by Asarin, Cervelle, Degorre, Dima, Horn and Kozyakin. The rank of an entropy game is defined as the maximal rank among all the ambiguity matrices determined by strategies of the two players. We show that entropy games with a fixed rank, in their original formulation, can be solved in polynomial time, and that an extension of entropy games incorporating weights can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time under the same fixed rank condition.
title Universal Complexity Bounds Based on Value Iteration for Stochastic Mean Payoff Games and Entropy Games
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.09044