The Winner-Take-All Dilemma

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Kikuchi, Kazuya, Koriyama, Yukio
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2022
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author Kikuchi, Kazuya
Koriyama, Yukio
author_facet Kikuchi, Kazuya
Koriyama, Yukio
contents We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule. Our numerical computation for the US Electoral College verifies its sensibility.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_09574
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The Winner-Take-All Dilemma
Kikuchi, Kazuya
Koriyama, Yukio
Theoretical Economics
We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule. Our numerical computation for the US Electoral College verifies its sensibility.
title The Winner-Take-All Dilemma
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.09574