Withholding Verifiable Information
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2022
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| Soggetti: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915979804540928 |
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| author | Shishkin, Denis Titova, Maria Zhang, Kun |
| author_facet | Shishkin, Denis Titova, Maria Zhang, Kun |
| contents | We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full revelation, other equilibria are less well understood. We show that any equilibrium payoff can be obtained with a disclosure strategy corresponding to a partition with a laminar structure that allows pooling of nonadjacent states. In a sender-preferred equilibrium, such a structure balances inducing more sender-favorable actions with deterring deviations. Leveraging this insight, we identify conditions under which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. We then apply these results to study selling with quality disclosure and influencing voters. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_09918 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Withholding Verifiable Information Shishkin, Denis Titova, Maria Zhang, Kun Theoretical Economics We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full revelation, other equilibria are less well understood. We show that any equilibrium payoff can be obtained with a disclosure strategy corresponding to a partition with a laminar structure that allows pooling of nonadjacent states. In a sender-preferred equilibrium, such a structure balances inducing more sender-favorable actions with deterring deviations. Leveraging this insight, we identify conditions under which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. We then apply these results to study selling with quality disclosure and influencing voters. |
| title | Withholding Verifiable Information |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.09918 |