Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2022
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866913395899367424 |
|---|---|
| author | Troyan, Peter |
| author_facet | Troyan, Peter |
| contents | In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While appealing, a drawback is RM mechanisms are not strategyproof. This paper investigates whether RM satisfies the weaker incentive notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM, Troyan and Morrill, 2020). I show any RM mechanism with full support - placing positive probability on all rank-minimizing allocations - is NOM. In particular, uniform randomization satisfies this condition. Without full support, whether an RM mechanism is NOM or not depends on the details of the selection rule. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_11359 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism Troyan, Peter Theoretical Economics In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While appealing, a drawback is RM mechanisms are not strategyproof. This paper investigates whether RM satisfies the weaker incentive notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM, Troyan and Morrill, 2020). I show any RM mechanism with full support - placing positive probability on all rank-minimizing allocations - is NOM. In particular, uniform randomization satisfies this condition. Without full support, whether an RM mechanism is NOM or not depends on the details of the selection rule. |
| title | Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.11359 |