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Auteur principal: Troyan, Peter
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2022
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Accès en ligne:https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.11359
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author Troyan, Peter
author_facet Troyan, Peter
contents In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While appealing, a drawback is RM mechanisms are not strategyproof. This paper investigates whether RM satisfies the weaker incentive notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM, Troyan and Morrill, 2020). I show any RM mechanism with full support - placing positive probability on all rank-minimizing allocations - is NOM. In particular, uniform randomization satisfies this condition. Without full support, whether an RM mechanism is NOM or not depends on the details of the selection rule.
format Preprint
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publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism
Troyan, Peter
Theoretical Economics
In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While appealing, a drawback is RM mechanisms are not strategyproof. This paper investigates whether RM satisfies the weaker incentive notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM, Troyan and Morrill, 2020). I show any RM mechanism with full support - placing positive probability on all rank-minimizing allocations - is NOM. In particular, uniform randomization satisfies this condition. Without full support, whether an RM mechanism is NOM or not depends on the details of the selection rule.
title Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.11359