Differentially Private Condorcet Voting

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Li, Zhechen, Liu, Ao, Xia, Lirong, Cao, Yongzhi, Wang, Hanpin
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2022
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author Li, Zhechen
Liu, Ao
Xia, Lirong
Cao, Yongzhi
Wang, Hanpin
author_facet Li, Zhechen
Liu, Ao
Xia, Lirong
Cao, Yongzhi
Wang, Hanpin
contents Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known Condorcet method, and focus on three classes of voting rules in this family: Laplacian Condorcet method ($\CMLAP_λ$), exponential Condorcet method ($\CMEXP_λ$), and randomized response Condorcet method ($\CMRR_λ$), where $λ$ represents the level of noise. We prove that all of our rules satisfy absolute monotonicity, lexi-participation, probabilistic Pareto efficiency, approximate probabilistic Condorcet criterion, and approximate SD-strategyproofness. In addition, $\CMRR_λ$ satisfies (non-approximate) probabilistic Condorcet criterion, while $\CMLAP_λ$ and $\CMEXP_λ$ satisfy strong lexi-participation. Finally, we regard differential privacy as a voting axiom, and discuss its relations to other axioms.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_13081
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Differentially Private Condorcet Voting
Li, Zhechen
Liu, Ao
Xia, Lirong
Cao, Yongzhi
Wang, Hanpin
Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known Condorcet method, and focus on three classes of voting rules in this family: Laplacian Condorcet method ($\CMLAP_λ$), exponential Condorcet method ($\CMEXP_λ$), and randomized response Condorcet method ($\CMRR_λ$), where $λ$ represents the level of noise. We prove that all of our rules satisfy absolute monotonicity, lexi-participation, probabilistic Pareto efficiency, approximate probabilistic Condorcet criterion, and approximate SD-strategyproofness. In addition, $\CMRR_λ$ satisfies (non-approximate) probabilistic Condorcet criterion, while $\CMLAP_λ$ and $\CMEXP_λ$ satisfy strong lexi-participation. Finally, we regard differential privacy as a voting axiom, and discuss its relations to other axioms.
title Differentially Private Condorcet Voting
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.13081