Talent Hoarding in Organizations

Fuente: arXiv
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Autore principale: Haegele, Ingrid
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2022
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author Haegele, Ingrid
author_facet Haegele, Ingrid
contents Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_15098
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Talent Hoarding in Organizations
Haegele, Ingrid
General Economics
Economics
Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related pay, team size, and talent visibility. Using quasi-random exposure to talent hoarding, I show that hoarding deters internal job applications, inhibiting career progression and altering talent allocation in the firm.
title Talent Hoarding in Organizations
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.15098