Large deviations for interacting particle dynamics for finding mixed equilibria in zero-sum games

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Nilsson, Viktor, Nyquist, Pierre
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2022
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author Nilsson, Viktor
Nyquist, Pierre
author_facet Nilsson, Viktor
Nyquist, Pierre
contents Finding equilibrium points in continuous minmax games has become a key problem within machine learning, in part due to its connection to the training of generative adversarial networks and reinforcement learning. Because of existence and robustness issues, recent developments have shifted from pure equilibria to focusing on mixed equilibrium points. In this work we consider a method for finding mixed equilibria in two-layer zero-sum games based on entropic regularisation, where the two competing strategies are represented by two sets of interacting particles. We show that the sequence of empirical measures of the particle system satisfies a large deviation principle as the number of particles grows to infinity, and how this implies convergence of the empirical measure and the associated Nikaidô-Isoda error, complementing existing law of large numbers results.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2206_15177
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Large deviations for interacting particle dynamics for finding mixed equilibria in zero-sum games
Nilsson, Viktor
Nyquist, Pierre
Machine Learning
Optimization and Control
Probability
60F10 (Primary) 90C47, 91A05 (Secondary)
Finding equilibrium points in continuous minmax games has become a key problem within machine learning, in part due to its connection to the training of generative adversarial networks and reinforcement learning. Because of existence and robustness issues, recent developments have shifted from pure equilibria to focusing on mixed equilibrium points. In this work we consider a method for finding mixed equilibria in two-layer zero-sum games based on entropic regularisation, where the two competing strategies are represented by two sets of interacting particles. We show that the sequence of empirical measures of the particle system satisfies a large deviation principle as the number of particles grows to infinity, and how this implies convergence of the empirical measure and the associated Nikaidô-Isoda error, complementing existing law of large numbers results.
title Large deviations for interacting particle dynamics for finding mixed equilibria in zero-sum games
topic Machine Learning
Optimization and Control
Probability
60F10 (Primary) 90C47, 91A05 (Secondary)
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.15177