Rawlsian Assignments

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Demeulemeester, Tom, Pereyra, Juan S.
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2022
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author Demeulemeester, Tom
Pereyra, Juan S.
author_facet Demeulemeester, Tom
Pereyra, Juan S.
contents We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. Drawing inspiration from the allocation of apartments in housing cooperatives, where families prioritize egalitarianism in assignments, we introduce the concept of Rawlsian assignment. We demonstrate the uniqueness, efficiency and anonymity of the Rawlsian rule. Our findings are validated using cooperative housing preference data, showing significant improvements in egalitarian outcomes over both the probabilistic serial rule and the currently employed rule.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2207_02930
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Rawlsian Assignments
Demeulemeester, Tom
Pereyra, Juan S.
Theoretical Economics
We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. Drawing inspiration from the allocation of apartments in housing cooperatives, where families prioritize egalitarianism in assignments, we introduce the concept of Rawlsian assignment. We demonstrate the uniqueness, efficiency and anonymity of the Rawlsian rule. Our findings are validated using cooperative housing preference data, showing significant improvements in egalitarian outcomes over both the probabilistic serial rule and the currently employed rule.
title Rawlsian Assignments
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.02930