Exploring The Resilience of Control Execution Skips against False Data Injection Attacks
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866929446173278208 |
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| author | Koley, Ipsita Adhikary, Sunandan Dey, Soumyajit |
| author_facet | Koley, Ipsita Adhikary, Sunandan Dey, Soumyajit |
| contents | Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed CPS-specific attack detection schemes as well as techniques for attack resilient controller design. However, such schemes also incur platform-level overheads. In this regard, some recent works have leveraged the use of skips in control execution to enhance the resilience of a CPS against false data injection (FDI) attacks.
In this paper, we provide an analytical discussion on when and how skipping a control execution can improve the resilience of the system against FDI attacks while maintaining the control performance requirement. We also propose a methodology to synthesize such optimal control execution patterns. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has provided any quantitative analysis about the trade-off between attack resilience and control performance for such aperiodic control execution. Finally, we evaluate the proposed method on several safety-critical CPS benchmarks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2207_08005 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Exploring The Resilience of Control Execution Skips against False Data Injection Attacks Koley, Ipsita Adhikary, Sunandan Dey, Soumyajit Systems and Control Cryptography and Security Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed CPS-specific attack detection schemes as well as techniques for attack resilient controller design. However, such schemes also incur platform-level overheads. In this regard, some recent works have leveraged the use of skips in control execution to enhance the resilience of a CPS against false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this paper, we provide an analytical discussion on when and how skipping a control execution can improve the resilience of the system against FDI attacks while maintaining the control performance requirement. We also propose a methodology to synthesize such optimal control execution patterns. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has provided any quantitative analysis about the trade-off between attack resilience and control performance for such aperiodic control execution. Finally, we evaluate the proposed method on several safety-critical CPS benchmarks. |
| title | Exploring The Resilience of Control Execution Skips against False Data Injection Attacks |
| topic | Systems and Control Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.08005 |