Measuring the Availability and Response Times of Public Encrypted DNS Resolvers
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915585616510976 |
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| author | Sharma, Ranya Feamster, Nick |
| author_facet | Sharma, Ranya Feamster, Nick |
| contents | Unencrypted DNS traffic between users and DNS resolvers can lead to privacy and security concerns. In response to these privacy risks, many browser vendors have deployed DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to encrypt queries between users and DNS resolvers. Today, many client-side deployments of DoH, particularly in browsers, select between only a few resolvers, despite the fact that many more encrypted DNS resolvers are deployed in practice. Unfortunately, if users only have a few choices of encrypted resolver, and only a few perform well from any particular vantage point, then the privacy problems that DoH was deployed to help address merely shift to a different set of third parties. It is thus important to assess the performance characteristics of more encrypted DNS resolvers, to determine how many options for encrypted DNS resolvers users tend to have in practice. In this paper, we explore the performance of a large group of encrypted DNS resolvers supporting DoH by measuring DNS query response times from global vantage points in North America, Europe, and Asia. Our results show that many non-mainstream resolvers have higher response times than mainstream resolvers, particularly for non-mainstream resolvers that are queried from more distant vantage points -- suggesting that most encrypted DNS resolvers are not replicated or anycast. In some cases, however, certain non-mainstream resolvers perform at least as well as mainstream resolvers, suggesting that users may be able to use a broader set of encrypted DNS resolvers than those that are available in current browser configurations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2208_04999 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Measuring the Availability and Response Times of Public Encrypted DNS Resolvers Sharma, Ranya Feamster, Nick Cryptography and Security C.2.2; C.2.5 Unencrypted DNS traffic between users and DNS resolvers can lead to privacy and security concerns. In response to these privacy risks, many browser vendors have deployed DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to encrypt queries between users and DNS resolvers. Today, many client-side deployments of DoH, particularly in browsers, select between only a few resolvers, despite the fact that many more encrypted DNS resolvers are deployed in practice. Unfortunately, if users only have a few choices of encrypted resolver, and only a few perform well from any particular vantage point, then the privacy problems that DoH was deployed to help address merely shift to a different set of third parties. It is thus important to assess the performance characteristics of more encrypted DNS resolvers, to determine how many options for encrypted DNS resolvers users tend to have in practice. In this paper, we explore the performance of a large group of encrypted DNS resolvers supporting DoH by measuring DNS query response times from global vantage points in North America, Europe, and Asia. Our results show that many non-mainstream resolvers have higher response times than mainstream resolvers, particularly for non-mainstream resolvers that are queried from more distant vantage points -- suggesting that most encrypted DNS resolvers are not replicated or anycast. In some cases, however, certain non-mainstream resolvers perform at least as well as mainstream resolvers, suggesting that users may be able to use a broader set of encrypted DNS resolvers than those that are available in current browser configurations. |
| title | Measuring the Availability and Response Times of Public Encrypted DNS Resolvers |
| topic | Cryptography and Security C.2.2; C.2.5 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.04999 |